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Abstract
This  essay provides  a preliminary assessment  of the transition  from the 1929 crisis  (and its 
solution) to the 2008 crisis. It points out how the modalities of the solution of the first crisis have 
paved the way for the recent crisis. The paper hangs the description and explanation of the whole 
process  on  a  combination  of  the  notions  of  business  cycles  and  phases  of  development,  a 
combination that allows the representation and explanation of the successive and various patterns 
of capitalism across the considered historical period. Thereafter we underline, mainly using the 
notion  of  functional  imperatives,  the  important  institutional  transformations  required  in  the 
passage from one type of capitalism to another, and the destabilizing effects that have resulted 
from  the  absence  of  those  transformations  in  the  wake  of  the  emergence  of  conflictual-
consumeristic  capitalism  and  financial  capitalism.  On  this  analytical  basis,  we  ground  the 
widening of the recent crisis, showing a growing menace of long-term stagnation, contradictions 
and conflicts. Finally, the paper delineates some institutional reforms essential to overcoming the 
structural deficiencies inherited by conflictual-consumeristic capitalism and the dawning and no 
less damaging drawbacks that are being prepared by financial capitalism.
Keywords:   Business cycles; Phases of development; The present failure of demand models; The 
question of money; Oganization of financial markets; Separation principle
1.   Introduction
The topic of the conference requires  an analysis of the character and the content of the three 
phases of the capitalist mode of production that have followed competitive capitalism, namely: 
monopoly capitalism, conflictual-consumeristic capitalism, and the financial capitalism now at 
work  on  a  world  scale.  The  absence  of  such  an  analysis  is  liable  to  generate  great 
misunderstanding with regard both to the diagnosis of the considered crises and the suggested 
therapies. 
     Monopoly capitalism, an outcome of the second industrial revolution, is associated with high 
increases in labour productivity. Yet the competitive character of the labour market kept down 
the level of wages. This lowered the degree of absorption of production through consumption, at 
the same time causing a high increase of profits; while investment,  due to the psychological 
volatility of entrepreneurs’ expectations, was unable to account for the absorption of profits and, 
more generally,  the level of production exceeding consumption. The consequent deficiency of 
effective demand, and hence unsold production, caused the reduction of output and the growth of 
unemployment, therefore a further and cumulative fall of demand that pushed towards the great 
economic crisis of the thirties.
     J. M. Keynes clearly understood – in stark contrast to the dominant economic thought of his 
day – the demand led nature of the crisis. He suggested appropriate remedies, mainly public 
expenditure,  even  if  wasteful,  and  deficit  spending  (for  the  joy  of  politicians)  and  the 
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construction of the welfare state. The substantial recovery that followed fueled a great expansion 
and  opened  the  door  to  the  advent  of  a  new  and  completely  different  age:  conflictual-
consumeristic capitalism. The associated growth of wages and public deficit stimulated by deficit 
spending policies, resulted in an apparent excess of global demand, thus suggesting restrictive 
policies.  But  the  absence  of  policies  appropriate  to  the  new  structural  deficiencies  of  the 
economy engendered stagnation. 
     Later,  the  growing  power  of  financial  capital  and  institutions,  in  the  context  of  the 
globalization process, opened the door to the present age of financial capitalism, and to the large 
scale crisis presently upon us, which is far from being adequately understood and threatens to 
condemn the modern world to a structural and endemic state of depression.
     The analysis of the considered events will bring us to consider the controversy on the demand 
pull or cost push nature of inflation. We make evident the growing inappropriateness of both 
these theoretical positions and try to delineate a more adequate explanation of the character both 
of inflation and the present deflation. The analysis will be accompanied by a discussion on the 
role of money, starting from the long and bitter controversy that grew up between the Keynesian 
theory stating that, by way of liquidity preference, the quantity of money determines the interest 
rate, and the orthodox monetary theory revived by M. Friedman and stating that the quantity of 
money determines the general price level. We clarify a different role plaid by money, in line with 
the  character  of  conflictual-consumeristic  capitalism,  and  make  evident  the  misleading 
theoretical and practical implications of the above controversy.
     This opens the door to a discussion on the financial system and its reformation: a simple and 
clear proposal aimed at erasing the troubles caused by the hegemony of financial system and to 
reduce this to its natural status of servant, instead of master, of production; we underline that this 
is  an  indispensable  condition  for  surmounting  many distortions  afflicting  the  present  age  of 
financial capitalism.
     Moreover,  I provide the exposition of an important and I think ineluctable reformation of 
economic process, a reform based on what I call ‘separation principle’ and regarding the relation 
between the side of production and that of distribution of income, a separation able to allow full 
employment, social justice and the maximum possible degree of efficiency, and to overcome the 
endemic  state  of  crisis,  heavy  contradictions,  useless  conflicts  and  the  consequent  growing 
degree of malaise.
2. Cycles and phases of development
The deepening of the two large crises that are the object of this conference, their differences and 
similarities, requires a preliminary analysis of cycles. More generally, an analysis of the course of 
human  societies,  their  motion  and  transformation,  falls  and  resurrections,  is  needed  for 
understanding the institutional and ethical changes indispensable to the coming economic and social 
world. Of course, such an analysis  should exclude some common notions of cycles that do not 
properly express cyclical motion, for instance, the so-called life-cycle of man or of a product. These 
supposed cycles only describe parabolic curves: birth, childhood, youth, maturity, old age, death; 
or, for new products: appearance on the market, diffusion, maturity, decay and possible elimination 
by the advent of new rival products. Such parables, which, moreover, may be cut short by untimely 
death or the rapid advent of new rival goods, do not express a cyclical vicissitude. In fact, cycles 
place side by side a succession of rises, decays and recoveries. As such, a cycle cannot be referred 
to individuals or specific goods but only to social systems. There is more. 
     Cyclical motion appears only in quite advanced economic and social systems, that is, societies  
endowed  with  institutions,  ethical  conditions  and,  in  sum,  forms  of  civilization  that  favor 
evolutionary motion. Various primitive societies have survived in stationary conditions down to the 
present age. The history of human societies has known great spurts of creativity followed by: (a) 
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ruinous crises and disintegration, as is typical of pluralist, decentralized orders agitated by strong 
antagonism and competition but lacking organizational strength (ancient Greece being a case in 
point); or (b) an almost unbroken continuity of behavior across centuries, an interminable quasi-
stationariness after having reached considerable levels of social and cultural development (this case 
is represented by the great centralized bureaucratic orders and empires, the most typical of which is 
the ancient Chinese empire). Both these kinds of social orders have known important periods of 
growth, have been hit and sometimes annihilated by natural disasters, military invasions or internal 
contradictions;  thereafter,  their  cultural,  ideological  and  social  conquests  have  been  partially 
revived and improved centuries later by other, ascending peoples.
     Social  processes have assumed cyclical  contents only after the birth,  in Western European 
countries, of the modern dynamic society; itself a consequence of the installation of the economy, 
with its mercantile and entrepreneurial action, at center stage and as the leading sector of the social 
system. Therefore, only by starting from such a transformation can the study of the motion of the 
economy and society benefit from the theory of cycles. 
     But the mere analysis of cycles is insufficient for the understanding of social processes. Such 
understanding,  and the  related  comparison  of  different  and subsequent  cycles,  requires  a  more 
general notion on which to graft cycles, namely: the notion of historical phases. Such a grafting is  
indispensable in order to understand the character and changeable content of the cyclical motion 
over time and, more generally, to arrange the process of becoming of human societies, that is, from 
where we come and towards where we are going: a grafting crucial, among other things, for making 
a comparison between the two large scale crises of 1929 and 2008.
     The problem is how to identify in a scientific way the various historical phases. Identification 
can be based on the character of the general conditions of development in the course of history and,  
more precisely, on the institutional and ethical-ideological and organizational forms at large that 
must be fulfilled for reasons of organizational rationality and efficiency in the presence of the given 
conditions  of  development.  We  denominate  those  necessary  organizational  forms  ‘functional 
imperatives’; while we denominate ‘ontological imperatives’ the institutional and ethical forms able 
to feed human evolutionary skills1.  So,  the functional  imperatives signal the historical  phase of 
development, while ontological imperatives feed, with the dynamical capacities of social systems, 
the possible succession of phases of development. Let’s insist that functional imperatives concern 
institutional,  ethical  and power forms  required  by the  existing  as  well  as  the  future  phases  of 
development; this allows us to arrive at important knowledge on the contents of coming ages.
     The advent of dynamic society has entailed, not only the birth of the cycle of economic and  
social processes, but also the shortening of historical ages, as a consequence of the acceleration of 
the change of the general conditions of development. Our combination of the notions of cycle and 
phase of development uses a peculiar theory and explanation of the cycle, which is almost entirely 
ignored  by the  numerous  theoretical  studies  of  the  cycle,  such as  those  founded on:  monetary 
causes, the behavior of the banking system and its instability and attitude with regard to interest 
rates; variations of stocks; interaction between the multiplier and the accelerator; the existence of 
ceilings and floors, etc. The cycle on which we insist results from the phenomenon of dynamic 
competition  as  expressing the interaction  between entrepreneurship,  innovation  and uncertainty. 
Therefore,  it  is  strictly  endogenous  in  nature  and,  moreover,  more  inclusive  than  other  cycles 
emphasizing innovation and entrepreneurship, such as the Schumpeterian ones. It is activated by 
entrepreneurs’  actions,  precisely,  the  entrepreneurial  search  for  profit  opportunities  through 
innovation that causes disequilibria and uncertainty followed by arbitrage directed to derive profits 
from disequilibria  thus causing the reduction of disequilibria and radical uncertainty and hence the 
advent of a new surge of innovations. So, uncertainty plays an important role in the whole process 
and is not merely intended as a cloud of unknowing but displays an endogenous character. This 
cycle  can concern both the medium range (intermediate  cycles)  and the long run (long waves), 
depending on the character (radical or incremental) of innovations.
1 See A. Fusari, ‘Methodological misconceptions in the social sciences’, Springer 2014, chapter 2
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     The cycle that shapes the dynamic competition process has deeply characterized, with a variable 
content,  the  history of  the  modern  world,  starting  from the  achievement  by the  economy of  a 
leading role in medieval society.  This opened the flood gates to the great creative and turbulent 
surge expressed by the Renaissance, which was followed by the tremendous wars and malaise that 
afflicted  the  seventeenth  century  (the  ‘iron  century’).  An age  of  relative  and peaceful  serenity 
cheered the eighteenth century and prepared the advent of the first industrial revolution, which was 
followed  by  a  succession  of  capitalist  cycles  and  phases  of  development,  in  particular  four 
frequently  cited  long waves  activated  by very  important  innovations,  and a  fifth  wave now in 
course, probably more intriguing, full of surprises and more demanding than previous ones.
     In order to understand the two large crises of 1929 and 2008 and the associated cycles, it is  
necessary to start from the phase of monopolistic capitalism and follow with the two more recent 
phases and long waves. 
3.  The  1929  crisis  and  its  solution,  the  appearance  of  new  misunderstandings  and 
contradictions.
3.1  The characteristics of the large-scale crisis of 1929 are well known. A large number of studies 
have generated a convergence of opinions on the nature of the crisis and the therapies that might 
have been used to treat it. Therefore, we limit ourselves here to a mere synthetic overview of the 
subject. Indeed, we shall concentrate our main attention on what followed the solution of the crisis: 
the  implications  of  that  solution  and  subsequent  development  of  debate  up  to  the  2008  crisis. 
Furthermore, we shall attempt to consider what will probable now happen.
     Starting from the beginning of the nineteenth century, capitalism (in its so-called competitive 
character) experienced the advent of a fully dynamic competition. The instability of the economy 
grew with  the  intensification  of  this  kind  of  competition,  centered  as  it  was  on  the  interaction 
between entrepreneurship, innovation and radical uncertainty. 
      The  intensification  of  innovative  processes  stimulates  radical  uncertainty,  and this  causes 
instability.  The degree of such endogenous instability generated by the economic system largely 
depends on the share of saving of the national product waiting to be invested. In fact, and as is well 
known,  investment  concerns  the  long  run  and,  therefore,  is  strongly  influenced  by  changing 
expectations and, hence, by the level of uncertainty, which negatively influences expectations.
     With the advent of so-called monopolistic capitalism, mainly as a result of the great innovations 
(steel,  chemistry,  electricity,  petroleum and the  internal  combustion  engine)  that  distinguish  the 
second industrial revolution, the instability of the economy jumped again. Put precisely, profits grew 
substantially,  due to  the great  increase  of labor  productivity  and the contemporary weakness or 
inexistence of trade unions – or, in other words, the competitive character of the labour market in the 
presence of a substantial excess of labour force, which kept wages low; but the utilization of these 
high  profits  was made  difficult  by the  instability  of  investment,  which  in  turn caused an  acute 
deficiency of aggregate demand and a strong fall of production and employment:  the large-scale 
crisis of 1929. 
     The economic thought of the time, deeply influenced by (so-called) Say’s law that production 
generates  the  demand  necessary  to  absorb  it,  was  unable  to  understand  the  new  disconcerting 
situation,  and  was  hence  unable  to  offer  analyses  suitable  for  a  solution  to  the  crisis.  A great 
confusion dominated the scene, both among theorists and practical men.
     J. M. Keynes was the economist who properly diagnosed the nature of the crisis and the way to  
overcome it. He saw clearly that the crisis was a result of a marked deficiency of demand, and he 
saw too the causes of this  deficiency.  Keynes’ analysis  provides an outstanding example of the  
unification of economics and political economy; in fact, his diagnosis implies the requisite therapies  
for  the  overcoming of  the  crisis.  He recommended  the  pursuit  of  full  employment  through the 
support of demand, based mainly on the incomes of the poor men (who have a high propensity to  
consume), deficit spending and the construction of a welfare state that has come to constitute one of 
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the main achievements of civilization. As a result, Western nations came to know an age of progress 
such as the world had never known: a real golden age of capitalism that continued for more than 
twenty years and has transmitted an important inheritance to future generations.
     A particularly important element of the new experience, however, was no doubt the advent of 
new contradictions,  which were unfortunately ignored,  as too were the transformations  that they 
called for. This is  what we have to examine,  in order to be able to understand the roots of the 
increasingly serious difficulties  and misconceptions  that  have led up to  and followed the recent 
large-scale crisis of 2008. 
     According to Keynesian’s teaching, investment is the instrumental variable  par excellence: a 
variable  which is not conditioned by the level  of saving since investment  would determines the 
saving it needs. This interpretation depends on the hypothesis that, in principle, capitalists’ decisions 
on  investment  and  consumption  have  an  exogenous  character  and  are  the  fundamental  a  priori 
element in the whole process.2 But such a hypothesis is valid only in particular conditions. It was 
valid  in  the  situation  that  Kaynes  considered;  but  it  is  far  from being  valid  in  every  case.  In 
particular, the validity of the above hypothesis and perspective is strictly conditional on the collateral 
effectiveness of the Keynesian hypothesis  that  trade union bargaining is able to determine only  
money wages but not real wages. If this is indeed the case, then the distribution of income between 
wages and profits is forced to adjust (by definition) to demand, thus constituting a merely residual 
variable (i.e. a variable consequent with respect to the level and composition of demand, mainly with 
respect to the level of investment). This hypothesis entails that it is sufficient to influence demand 
and  its  composition  in  order  to  influence  not  only  production  but  also  (due  to  the  consequent 
movements of prices) the shares of income distribution. In brief, the amount of profit depends on the 
amount  of  investment,  what  generates  the saving necessary to  finance  investment  and the same 
incentive to invest.  Consequently, given the conditions postulated above, the problem of demand 
and capitalists’ decisions on the amount of consumption and investment constitute the fundamental a 
priori of the whole process (demand led approach). 
3.2 It is useful to repeat that the whole approach is based on Keynes’ hypothesis about the labour  
market; a hypothesis assuming that real wage has a residual character (inside the limits clarified  
by Kaldor, or within the limits of Robinson’s ‘inflationary barrier’). We label such an assumption  
the ‘postulate of the residuality of real wages’. 
     Now we must ask ourselves what are the indispensable conditions if the above postulate is to be 
made effective. It is clearly evident that the effectiveness requires at least one of the following 
conditions:
a) Workers are completely affected by the so called ‘monetary illusion’.
b) The productive system is coming to the end of a period of chronic stagnation and entering 
into a new phase of great dynamism characterized by a high rate of development or a strong 
‘acceleration’ of the growth rate. In these conditions, the capacity of capital to pay wages 
can even precede as well as fully meet wage claims, thereby avoiding a real conflict over 
income distribution.
c) Workers’ contractual power is very weak so that they are forced to submit to the bargaining 
power of  the opposing party.  Such weakness  cannot  be attributed  to  a  supposed almost 
unconditional control of capitalist, and the ready availability, of financial resources.3 In fact, 
2 The  same  hypothesis  characterizes  Kaldor’s  approach.  Kaldor  introduces  into  the  model  the  natural  rate  of  
development and hence technical progress and demographic increase; nevertheless, he attributes to investment the role 
of substantial and main instrumental variable.
3 Kregel wrongly emphasizes this aspect. He writes: “The possibility of creating financial means previously… with 
respect to effective production… allows entrepreneurs to owe real resources according to their real earnings and their  
wealth… The possibility for capitalists to dispose some financial resources in order to buy resources to be invested 
confers on them the control of last instance of the proportions according to which the available resources by the system 
take the form of consumption and investment” and hence (we may add) of wages and profits. See J. A. Kregel (1975),  
p. 225.
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this does not imply an unconditional control of the labour force, even if it constitutes an 
indispensable  premise  for  such  control.  This  control  requires  indeed  much  more: 
substantially, in market economies, it requires the operation, in the presence of an adequate 
excess of labour force,  of both the mechanism of demand and supply of labour and the 
collateral  absence  of  the  indexation  of  wages  (or  the  absence  of  trade  unions  with 
sufficiently strong bargaining power) so as not to allow them an almost complete covering 
of inflation.4
 It is easy to see that condition (a) can only work for brief intervals of time and only occasionally, 
unless the working class is particularly ingenuous. The same is valid for the situation under (b), 
which after all  does not represent a Keynesian condition of stagnation of demand, even if it  is 
consistent with the Keynesian view intended in a more general sense. In sum, the effectiveness of 
the Keynesian postulate of residuality of real wages requires the situation under (c), that is, that 
wages depend on the availability of labour force in the presence of large scale unemployment.5 This 
was the situation  that  Keynes  actually  observed and that  enabled him to presume a substantial 
residuality of real wages and, consequently,  to ignore the problem of income distribution or to 
consider it as a consequential and secondary issue, without thereby violating reality but perfectly 
interpreting its contents.
     Later N. Kaldor and J. Robinson (who lived in a period increasingly concerned with the problem 
of income distribution) subjected the above postulate of residuality to the constraint that real wages 
exceed the subsistence level. Such a correction does not undermine the substance of the considered 
theory;6 but it is far from being satisfactory when (as we shall see) it comes to the interpretation of a 
world  in  which  the  operation  of  the  condition  of  the  demand  and  supply  of  labour  force  is 
increasingly and explicitly contradicted by observable facts.
    Moreover, it must be reminded that Kaldor and Robinson’s theory of income distribution,7 as also 
Pasinetti’s contribution on this subject,8 suppose the full employment of resources. This hypothesis 
enables these three economists to provide a rigorous definition of the shares of income distribution. 
But their analysis concerns the long run and assumes that any situation of deficient demand has 
already  been  remedied  (through  Keynesian  therapies).  This  Cambridge  theory  of  income 
distribution,  founded  on the  postulate  of  residuality  of  real  wages,  implies  an  a  priori  denial  
(through the hypothesis  of  full  employment)  of  the possibility  that  two of the above conditions  
(required by that postulate) are verified. These conditions are (b), concerning the short run, and (c), 
that is, the operation in the labor market of the mechanism of demand and supply of labour, in the 
presence  of  an  excess  of  labour  force,  etc.  Therefore,  the  postulate  at  the  basis  of  the  post-
Keynesian  Cambridge  theory  of  distribution  could  operate  only  if  condition  (a)  –  concerning 
monetary illusion – is also operating. But unfortunately this possibility is completely unrealistic 
with regard to the long run. So we must conclude that the Cambridge theory of income distribution  
is  contradictory,  being  based  on  contradictory  assumptions  (full  employment  in  a  long  run  
perspective and residuality of real wages).9 
4 It is not necessary that this covering is total. In fact, if the covering of inflation through the indexation of wages is near  
to one, a very high rate of inflation would be necessary to allow the profit share to rise. 
5 This means that, in practice, the statement that wage bargaining is in terms of money wages but not real wages does 
not imply that labor market conditions do not influence real wages. In fact, the independence of real wages from the  
contents and the results of wage bargaining depends, after all, on the particular conditions of the labour market that  
Keynesian  theory  implicitly  presumes,  unless  the  situations  under  (a)  and  (b)  are  verified.  This  is  possible  with 
reference to the short run. In fact, in this case the postulate of residuality of real wages is operative also in the absence  
of condition (c). 
6 Kaldor himself underlines that subsistence wages only characterize the initial stages of development. See N. Kaldor 
(1965).
7 See J. Robinson (1961).
8 The main contribution of Pasinetti  in this regard is his article entitled ‘Rate of profit and income distribution in  
relation to the rate of economic growth’. Review of Economic Studies, vol. XXIX, October 1962. 
6
     Of  course,  the Cambridge  theory has  some other  problem as  well,  for  instance,  Kaldor’s 
mechanism through which full employment equilibrium is achieved, or the a priori assumption of 
Robinson and Pasinetti as to the existence of such equilibrium.10 But, in contrast to the analysis 
above, these are issues that do not concern the foundations of the theory under consideration.
4   Consequences and meaning, for demand led models, of the non-operation of the postulate 
of residuality of real wages 
The success of Keynesian recipes opened the door to a new and – in terms of content – opposite 
phase  of  development  with  respect  to  monopolist  capitalism,  which  can  be  denominated 
conflictual-consumeristic capitalism.  This new state of affairs  was characterized by competition 
based largely on new products, the stimulation of consumption through advertisement, high wages 
in the most dynamic sectors, due to both the increased bargaining power of trade unions and to the 
interest of firms in stimulating the consumption of new goods and maintaining an unvaried mark-up 
margin so as to obstruct the entrance of competitors,  as well  as to avoid loss of profits due to 
strikes. This is a quite different world to that expressed by the phase of monopolistic capitalism, 
which  latter  excluded  the  relevance,  in  conflicting  terms,  of  income  distribution,  even  if  it 
emphasized the contribution of this to demand.  
     In the case that the postulate of residuality of real wages does not work ( that is,  that the  
hypotheses  set  out  in  sub-section  3.2  of  the  previous  section  are  erased  by  conflictual  
consumerism), the advent of pressures on the side of distribution will imply that profits come before 
investment; in fact, in this case the decisions to invest are conditioned by their profitability, not vice  
versa. This means that, in the presence of the condition here supposed, interventions on demand 
cannot remedy the difficulties at work (on the contrary, they may worsen them, as in this condition 
the distributive  shares cannot  simply adjust to  the level  and composition  of demand but  rather 
follow a logic that leaves out of consideration the shape that demand will assume and is anterior to  
this shape). It is important to consider this point in some detail.
     Let us make the assumption that, due to the class struggle and in the absence of the operation of 
the  postulate  of  residuality  of  real  wages,  profits  fall  too  low.  In  these  conditions,  investment 
decreases  (for  various  reasons:  both  due  to  financing,  because  entrepreneurs  thereby  hope  to 
determine a change of distribution to their own advantage, and because profits are the main stimulus 
to entrepreneurship). With the decrease in investment comes also a parallel decrease of production 
or, in other words,  a decrease in the degree of utilization of the available resources. At the same 
time, the increase in the labour share of income accompanying the above circumstance will cause a 
collateral increase in the share of consumption of total income. Probably the public deficit will also 
grow as a consequence of the intermediary role that public administration fulfils in the struggle for 
income  distribution,  especially  if  this  struggle  is  particularly  harsh.  In  the  presence  of  these 
conditions, analysis will reveal, on the whole, quite a high level of demand (notwithstanding the 
reduction of investment and the under-utilization of productive capacity). This high demand is due 
to the expansion of consumption and, probably, also of the amount of the public deficit.11 (We shall 
see later that, in the presence of these conditions, the demand for goods and services, with respect to 
their production, will be remarkable in the average). Therefore, such analysis will inform us that we  
are not in the presence of a deficiency of effective demand but rather in the presence of a problem  
9  It could be objected that the assumption of the full utilization of capital (but not labour) would make valid the post-
Keynesian theory of income distribution. But such a hypothesis  (scarcity of capital  with respect  to labour) can be 
considered appropriate only with reference to underdeveloped economies, for which the Keynesian theory is not valid  
for  different  reasons,  that  is,  due  to  the  absence  of  homogeneity  of  the  economic  system,  indispensable  to  make  
effective the leadership of demand.
10  In this matter, it may be useful to refer to an article by U. Marani (1976).
11 It may be useful to underline that while a deficiency of demand can happen in this case, it can arise as a consequence  
of restrictive policies directed to reduce the inflationary pushes due to pressures on distribution (which last remains 
therefore the fundamental a priori element of the situation).
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concerning  the  composition  of  demand;  specifically,  this  is  a  problem  arising  from  the 
unsatisfactory level of one part of demand, namely, investment. As a consequence, the increase of 
some other component of demand will not improve the performance of the economy (as, on the 
contrary, would happen in Keynesian conditions).
     It may be objected that the under-utilization of plant is an obstacle to investment and that the 
expansion of demand constitutes, therefore, in this case, an incentive to investment. But only the 
premise of the above objection is correct; the deduction is a great and very frequent error. Such a 
deduction would be right only on the hypothesis that the problem starts from the side of demand, 
and is clearly incorrect if it originates in distribution (and when the squeeze of demand, if present, is 
only consequent to restrictive measures directed to control inflationary pushes caused by pressure 
on distribution).
     Moreover, a careful analysis of the condition of demand will inform us that not even a policy of 
direct support of investment (this representing, in the supposed condition, the weakest component 
of demand) may remedy the situation. Let’s set out the reason for this.
4.2    The situation can be characterized (again) in terms of an ex ante excess of saving with respect 
to ex ante investment, arising from the fall of investment. But investment does not represent, in the 
postulated conditions, the instrumental variable par excellence, as it does in Keynesian schemes; in 
fact, investment cannot be freely stimulated. More precisely, it cannot be presumed that an adequate 
increase  of  this  variable  is  able  to  return  the  economy  to  motion  and  warrant  an  adequate 
profitability.  Of  course,  it  is  in  principle  possible  to  increase  public  investment,  that  is,  the 
exogenous  part  of  investment.  But  this  will  not  of  itself  cause  an  automatic  increase  in  the 
performance of private investments and, hence, will not cause their increase (as would occur if the 
postulate of residuality of real wages were working). Therefore, private investment will continue to 
stagnate,  due  to  its  supposed low profitability.  Moreover,  from the  fact  that  in  the  postulated 
conditions investment is in itself unable to generate profit, it can be inferred that this investment has 
not the thaumaturgic virtue of generating the saving that it needs. This implies that an increase of 
the public deficit aimed at financing exogenous (public) investment, instead of contributing to the 
stimulation of production, can further worsen the performance of the economy and simply subtract 
resources  from  private  investment.  The  accumulation  process  would  be  stimulated  only  if, 
collaterally to the increase of exogenous investment,  some decrease of consumption and public 
deficit and adequate transfers (mainly in the form of incentives) to firms were in operation. But 
such a policy is quite different from the mere stimulus of demand. Moreover, while this should 
provide a stimulus to the accumulation process, it will not warrant its continuation.
     For the sake of maximum clarity, these considerations on investment can be put in a different 
and more general form. In demand led models, the fall of investment is generated by the volatility 
of expectations. As is well known, the rise of demand makes expectations more optimistic, thus 
stimulating  investment  and  hence  determining  an  expansionary  spiral.  However,  if  the  fall  of 
investment is due to distribution pressures that reduce profit (a situation less volatile than that in 
which expectations play the major role), the stimulus of demand is unable to stimulate investment 
and production. For in this case it is the struggle for income distribution that is the starting point of 
depression, and the rise of demand is impotent with regard to making the terms of this struggle 
more favorable to capital; indeed, if anything, the opposite is likely to occur.
 4.3     In an open economy,  the operation of the postulate of residuality of real wages is also 
obstructed  by  the  fact  that  any  increase  of  the  prices  of  commodities  produced  by  domestic 
entrepreneurs is opposed by the competition of foreign goods, both abroad and in the domestic 
market.  Therefore,  in  this  case,  the  conditioning  arising  from the  side  of  distribution  is  more 
stringent and may cause an increase of imports, a decrease of exports, and even an increase in the 
export of capital for reasons of profitability, thus worsening the deficit of foreign accounts. This 
will cause a squeeze of demand directed at reducing such a deficit. In sum, it should be clear that, in 
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the conditions described above, the squeeze of demand is generated by a situation that genetically 
has little to do with the level of demand. Of course, the situation described will be considerably 
exacerbated by any increases in the price of imported raw materials.
     So, the struggle for income distribution, which is an important component of modern societies 
starting  from  the  advent  of  conflictual-consumeristic  capitalism,  generates  some  apparent 
conditions of deficiency of demand that may, in turn, give rise to mistaken interpretations as to the 
behavior of the economy and, consequently, the suggestion of erroneous therapies. It is therefore 
important to set out some other clarifications on the matter.
4.4  The operation of pressures on the side of income distribution causes inflation. This implies that 
the previous analysis allows also for some clarification regarding inflation.
     The debate on the nature and causes of the increase of prices has always been fierce. It gave rise  
to  the  well  known controversy  between  Keynesian  and  monetarist  approaches.  The  monetarist 
theories will be considered in the next section.
     Keynesian economists do not have a univocal position on inflation. The main bone of contention 
concerns whether the primary cause of inflation lies in demand-pull or cost-push.12 We hope that 
our analysis  is able to provide some clarification of the controversy.  The Keynesian arguments  
surrounding inflation arise due to a pretense that much more can be extracted from the Keynesian  
approach than it is actually able to say. But the controversy over cost-push and demand-pull causes 
of inflation cannot be resolved within the Keynesian approach and, indeed, the arguments become 
circular,  resulting  in  profound  misunderstandings.  However,  if  abandoning  those  schemes,  we 
approach the analysis of inflation through a more global and less unilateral approach we can hope to 
obtain  a useful  clarification  on the controversy.  This  point  can best  understood in light  of our 
previous discussion, as we shall now see.
     So-called cost-push inflation increasingly appears to be due to pressures arising from conflict 
over the distribution of income;13 such pressures constitute at  present the single most  important 
cause of inflation. We have seen that these pressures come together with a substantial expansion of 
public expenditure (due to the intermediary role that the public administration is obliged to perform 
in the presence of marked social conflict) and, more generally, with an excess of demand (intended 
as discussed in the previous point above). This conflation gives to those inflationary motions the 
appearance  of  an  inflation  stimulated  by  demand;  thus  providing  one  part  of  the  Keynesian 
economists seemingly good reasons for maintaining that this is in fact the case.
     But we know that the pressures surrounding income distribution are also accompanied by some 
degree of under-utilization of resources, thus enabling other Keynesian economists, who see in this 
under-utilization  of  resources  a  clear  indication  of  the  deficiency  of  demand,  to  maintain  that 
inflation is due to costs. But the indication of this under-utilization of productive capacity as a proof 
of deficiency of demand is senseless, as we know. These latter economists could properly defend 
the thesis that the inflation is due to costs only by abandoning the Keynesian scheme.14 And in fact, 
as  soon as  we do abandon  such an  approach,  the  equivocation  disappears:  it  becomes  clearly  
evident that it is completely mistaken to consider this inflationary motion as due to demand and  
12  On such controversy and the attempts to resolve it see, in particular, the articles by: S. Weintraub (1980), and R. J. 
Bole and R. S. Bodkin (1972).
13 Inflation  due  to  the  costs  of  imported  raw materials  should  also  be  considered  as  a  consequence  of  pressures  
concerning the distribution of income or, more precisely, as a consequence of the redistribution of those costs among 
various countries. More generally, the cost increases of raw materials must be considered primarily as a consequence of 
the international conflict for the distribution of wealth among developed and underdeveloped countries.
14     Cost inflation would be consistent with the Keynesian scheme only if the entrepreneur were able to answer the  
motion of money wages with collateral increases of the prices of produced goods able to neutralize the pressure of this  
motion on income distribution. In fact, in this case the postulate of residuality of real wages would operate. But this 
could happen only on the extremely unrealistic hypothesis that workers are plainly subject to monetary illusion and 
international  competition  is  absent.  In  the  absence  of  these  conditions,  the  above  motion  of  wages  would  cause 
considerable pressures on income distribution and this would force the analysis outside the Keynesian approach.
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operate interventions based on such a conviction. At the same time, we perceive the substantial 
appropriateness of the alternative point of view.
     But we consider it more appropriate to indicate the inflationary motion considered here as an 
inflation due to distribution, in order to capture the real nature of the inflation; and I dearly hope 
that such reflection throws some light on a controversy that, if not solved, will continue to generate 
profound  theoretical  and  empirical  misunderstanding.  The  next  section  will  provide  a  more 
complete treatment of the matter. 
5.  A brief review on the role and operation of money from the thirties of the last century to 
the present time
Both the role and the meaning of money have changed substantially over time, in parallel with some 
important transformations within the economic and social systems.  We have seen that the period 
between the second and third industrial revolutions witnessed the diffusion of oligopolies together 
with a related large increase in productivity, low wages and variable entrepreneurial expectations 
and investment, and hence a recurrent deficiency of effective demand and increase in liquid money. 
The emergent situation persuaded Keynes to emphasize the idea of liquidity preference and to base 
the explanation of the rate of interest on the supply and demand for money, as opposed to the earlier 
appeal  to the quantity theory of money and related account of the interest  rate in terms of the 
relationship of savings and investment.15 But as is not infrequent in the history of social thought, the 
Keynesian view triumphed only at the moment when its own foundations began to be shaken by 
further social and economic development. 
     From the seventh decade of the last century, a long and bitter controversy grew up between the  
Keynesian theory that (by way of liquidity preference) the quantity of money determines the interest 
rate, and the orthodox theory revived by Milton Friedman that the quantity of money determines the 
general  price  level.  Actually,  late  twentieth-century  socio-economic  conditions  fitted  neither 
monetarist nor Keynesian theories.  Precisely, the late second half of the last century witnessed a 
fundamental and unprecedented change, a transition from monopoly capitalism to what we have 
called  conflictual-consumeristic  capitalism  (that,  as  we  saw,  was  distinguished  by:  advertising 
mainly directed to stimulate consumption of new products; high wage increases in advanced sectors 
stimulated more by the firms’ interest in stimulating the demand of new products and keep mark-up 
unvaried, than by trade unions demand; imitational growth of wages and consumption in the less 
dynamic sectors of the economy).  One consequence of this transformation has been a qualitative 
change in the role of money, which may primarily be expressed as the increasing importance of 
what may be called the ‘nominal demand for money’, i.e. variations in the quantity of money have  
been endogenously  stimulated, and this by both price changes and in consequence of the conflict  
for income distribution16. This demand for money is just the opposite of the Keynesian preference 
for liquidity associated with the deficiency (or excess) of effective demand. In fact, while the notion 
of demand for real money (liquidity preference) refers to the role of money as a fund of value, the 
demand for nominal money concerns the role of money as means of payment. More in general, this 
new situation, characterized as it was by the  endogenous supply of money, differed substantially, 
both from the situation diagnosed by Keynes,17 in which exogenous variations of the money supply 
15 Hobson’s study on imperialism preceded Keynes in underlining the explanatory role of the deficiency of effective  
demand, but his analysis disregarded the question of money and interest rate.
16 See A. Fusari (1981)
17 Some neo-Keynesians, e.g. N. Kaldor and J. Robinson, underlined the endogenous character of money variations. But 
they did not consider that this endogenous character destroys the relation between the money supply and production 
based on the interest rate; in fact, they ignored its reductive impact on the preference for liquidity and hence on the  
validity of the theory of interest rate based on the demand and supply of money. These students did indeed express 
doubts on the incisiveness of the relation between money supply and production, but for different reasons from those we 
underline, and they sometimes improperly assimilate interest rate to profit rate. 
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determine  the  interest  rate,  and from the  situation  described by the  quantity  theory  of  money, 
according to which exogenous variations of the money supply determine prices. 
     So, the Keynesian doctrines were not equipped to react to (and govern) this consumeristic  
landing. Their foundation on demand induced consideration of the new situation as characterized by 
an excess (rather than a deficiency) of effective demand, thus suggesting the necessity of reducing 
such an excess through restrictive monetary policies (that is, the contrary of the expansive policies 
required  in  the  presence  of  a  deficiency  of  effective  demand).  This  condemned  consumeristic 
capitalism  to  the  phenomenon  of  stop-go and  the  distinction  between  short  and  long  period 
problems, with the short run problems prevailing as more imperative over the medium and longer 
period structural issues constituting the back bone of programmatic designs. Precisely, structural 
policies  were  systematically  postponed  in  the  name  of  short  run  exigencies,  putting  off  their 
application until the advent of better conditions that, in the absence of any solution to the structural 
deficiencies, never arrived. The dominant economic thought of the day was not equipped to allow 
understanding that the new phase had nothing to do with the traditional theories of money, be they 
Keynesian or quantitative. So, Keynesianism was now caught out of time; a situation that facilitated 
the monetarist reaction. What is worse, the old Keynesianism blocked understanding that structural 
action and reformation was indispensable even with regard to the control of short period depression 
by  way  of  the  elimination  of  the  decay  and  dead  ends  caused  by  conflictual-consumeristic 
capitalism.
     Let  us  examine  more  closely  the  substance  and  the  effects  of  this  new state  of  affairs.  
Inconvertible paper money constitutes an efficacious instrument for taking the sting out of some of 
the contradictions that may afflict  the economy.  In particular,  it  has the potential  to diffuse the 
impact  of  the  conflict  over  income  distribution  upon  weak  and/or  ingenuous  social  groups. 
Employing a literary parallel, we may say that inconvertible money resembles don Circostanza (don 
Circumstance), an intriguer and opportunist lawyer, who in defense of the people of Fontamara 18 
against the plan of the mayor to deprive them of the water of the brook, proposes that each of the 
two conflicting parties be awarded ¾ of the water. With this trick, he succeeds in placating a protest 
of the people intended to preserve more than one half of the available water.
      In  conflictual-consumeristic  capitalism,  the  money supply  is  stimulated,  as  just  seen,  by 
endogenous factors, primarily the conflict over income distribution. In some sense it reproduces don 
Circostanza’s expedient to placate Fontamara’s conflict by promising to the opposing parties more 
than the available water. In the presence of money illusion, a modest inflation is sufficient to make 
don Circostanza’s strategy bear fruit. But what happens if people begin to detect the illusory quality 
of  money wages  and the  object  of  the  bargain  becomes  real  wages?  The expansion of  public 
expenditure and public debt may become an alternative path to the elimination of the difficulties 
and inconsistencies that arise out of the struggle for income distribution. But it is only an apparent  
alternative.  In  the  end,  the  financing  of  the  public  deficit  stimulates  the  ‘nominal  demand  for 
money’ (the endogenous character of the last),  and hence inflation.
     It  is  precisely this  ‘cheeky’  use of money that  has  opened the door  to  some of the main 
difficulties afflicting financial markets today.
6.   What about the present?    
The behaviors referred to above drive (and force) the progressive restoration of the exogenous role 
of money; a restoration, however, that may be undermined by a heavy inheritance of public debt 
and inflationary potential. The situation is aggravated by the operation and strength of international 
financial markets in the modern global world, where speculation shifts enormous masses of capital 
instantaneously. There is no supranational authority able to discipline these activities and prevent 
18 See Ignazio Silone (1990 [1930]).
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the crises provoked by massive transfers of hot money.19 The evolution of financial instruments and 
markets easily renders obsolete older guidelines and codes of conduct. Worldwide speculation may 
force monetary depreciation upon monetary authorities, resulting in inflation and a perverse impact 
on financial markets. In this state of affairs, the restoration of an exogenous money supply becomes 
a difficult, not to say impossible task, while the control of the financial market is no longer within 
the  hands  of  the  individual  sovereign  state.  A new age  or  phase  of  development  has  started: 
financial capitalism
     The interest of students of economics in financial capital dates back more than a century. R. 
Hilferding’s book, Das Finanzkapital (1910), captured a great deal of attention.  But the dominant 
role, and hence the age, of financial capitalism began only recently, with the great acceleration of 
the globalization process on a world scale. The core of modern capitalism is finance and financial 
speculation.  ‘Production of commodities by means of commodities’ has been substituted by the 
production  of  money  by  means  of  money.  Enormous  holdings  entail  a  combined  control  of 
important  banks,  industrial  and  commercial  firms,  and  strongly  influence  political  power:  an 
extremely fragile state of affairs notwithstanding appearances, which, moreover, strongly stimulates 
disequilibria and inequalities.
     But the great holdings are a degenerate phenomenon that found on mere power relations both 
profitability and influence. From being a servant of production, financial capital has become master 
of production: a degenerate master, indeed, the agent of a truly unnatural transformation. The ghost 
of spread persecutes national states. The international financial market is submerged by financial 
by-products (hedge funds, private equities): a deceitful and extremely unstable house of cards.
     At the present moment, the situation of the European Community appears to be particularly 
acute and confused in this regard: the restoration of the exogenous character of the money supply is 
obstructed by the absence of a sovereign monetary authority concerned with the new currency, the 
Euro.  The  result  is  an  almost  free  terrain  for  international  speculation  that  is  primarily  the 
consequence  of  the  large  economic  and  financial  disequilibria  existing  between  the  various 
European economies, which condemns those countries afflicted by high public debt and some risk 
of insolvency both to high interest rates and to the enactment of significant reductions of public 
expenditure, wages and hence demand, with a consequent and endemic stagnation and a substantial 
inability to reduce public debt.
     We have seen that some of the main problems that have entangled the role of money with the 
behavior of financial markets derives from the conflict over income distribution, the mediating role 
of public expenditure and the consequent variation of money supply following what we have called 
the ‘demand for nominal money’. We have further seen that the attempt to control the consequent 
inflation  has  often  initiated  restrictive  money  policies,  thus  generating  recession  or,  as  an 
alternative, money devaluation, along with the inevitable implications for financial markets.  We 
shall see in the final section that one way to avoid these drawbacks is the separation of income 
distribution  from production,  with  the  exception  of  material  incentives  required  by particularly 
undesirable or risky activities, thereby reducing the market to a mere mechanism for the imputation 
of costs and efficiency and, in this way, preventing the conflict over the distribution of income from 
affecting the production side. This separation seems necessary in order to meet  the disorder of 
financial markets previously outlined. 
7.    Basic organizational needs of the present and coming economic systems
Now we come to consider what suggestions may explain the combination of the cyclical motion, 
generated  by  dynamic  competition,  with  the  notion  of  phases  of  historical  development (a 
combination discussed in section 2) mainly the requirements in terms of functional imperatives. As 
we have seen, the modern phases of development are shortened by the acceleration of evolutionary 
19 Significantly, J. E. Stiglitz (2002) has harshly criticized IMF policies.
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processes under the pressure of dynamic competition. We are going to ascertain the ‘necessity’ of 
transition, along this road, towards something different from capitalism.
     The acceleration of economic growth due to the first industrial revolution has opened the door to  
a succession of capitalist phases of development: competitive capitalism, monopolistic capitalism, 
conflictual-consumeristic capitalism, and, finally, financial capitalism. Four large crises and long 
waves have accompanied such succession, intermingled with intermediate and short cycles. What 
new institutional and ethical-ideological forms are required by these passages, in particular, that 
which is today in progress, ‘financial capitalism’? 
     Two phases of development have been known by modern world after the triumph of Keynesian 
revolution: conflictual-consumeristic capitalism and financial capitalism. Unfortunately, the world 
is far from carrying out the basic functional imperatives (as considered in section 2) requested by 
the  two phases  and the  corresponding general  conditions  of  development.  Only secondary  and 
contradictory  transformations  have  been  performed,  being  transformations  hindered  or  strongly 
conditioned by the capitalist character of the economy. The previous sections have tried to give a 
representation of this difficult process of rationalization. The difficulties probably are due, and they 
tend to grow, because the continuous process of change at  work, inaugurated by the advent of 
capitalism, needs something not contemplated by capitalism.  
     We shall consider now two basic functional imperatives and reorganizations that are required by 
the phases of conflictual consumeristic capitalism and financial capitalism, starting from this second 
phase for reasons of continuity with the previous two sections. 
7.1  A proposal concerning the organization of financial markets 
We delineate here a blueprint for a financing system of production capable, among other things, of 
clipping the wings of financial capital, stimulating entrepreneurship and contrasting the deficiency 
of global demand, and achieving a far greater openness than exists at present toward social justice. 
The financial system at present is a very complicated and slippery beast; we have seen that it is also  
heavily subject to malfunctioning and the tricks of speculation. It seems to us that the financing of 
production does not need such a complicated and insidious system, and could largely be replaced by 
the operation of the banking system, albeit not in its habitual features.
   A discussion of the procedures required to modify the banking system in accordance with what 
follows is not relevant in this context;  a detailed analysis  of the matter may form the theme of 
another  paper.  The important  point that  needs  to be emphasized at  this  juncture is  the need to 
radically  modify  the  central  function  of  the  banking  system  with  regard  to  the  funding  of 
production.  Financial  capital  is  not  at  present  at  the service of production but,  for the most,  it 
enslaves production and exploits the toiling community into the bargain. This distortion needs to be 
redressed in the sense that financial institutions become the servant, not the master, of production. 
Our proposal, aimed at heavily simplifying the complicated set of financial markets and activities, is 
presented here in as simple and transparent fashion as possible.
     Every year the community should define the share of value added to assign to consumption and 
investment, and to investment in selected strategic sectors. After that, care must be taken to ensure, 
through stimulus and instructions to the banking system, that these prescriptions are executed, as 
each investment is at the discretion of individual businesses. The capital required by the firms will 
come, in the first place, from profits. The uninvested portion of a firm’s profits may be set aside for  
future investment. But the financing of capital must generally exceed the reinvested profits, so as to 
allow the formation of new firms and the financing of firms’ investment plans in excess of gross 
profit. Such extra accumulation may be covered in part by private saving, which should yield a real  
interest rate of zero percent.20 However, savers should not be allowed to buy shares directly, since 
20 A real interest rate of zero percent on saving would actually be a bargain for savers who, over the course of time,  
have generally suffered a continuous devaluation of their savings owing to inflation, fraud and robbery, which in turn 
are mainly caused by speculation in financial markets. In another book by H. Ekstedt and A. Fusari entitled ‘Economic 
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the stock exchange is much worse than a gambling house. The rest of the funds required to achieve 
the planned rate of accumulation will be provided by a Fund of Common Wealth (see sub-section 
7.2  that  follows).  This  fund should  channel  the  necessary  quota  to  the  banking  system,  to  be 
distributed among firms.  The banking system should also finance investment  abroad, mainly in 
underdeveloped countries.
     Each bank’s application to the fund for resources should be judged on the basis of its profit rate. 
In fact,  bankers must be obliged to operate as entrepreneurs,  and their  commercial  tenure must 
depend on business results. The more successful they are, as expressed by the profit rate, the more 
capital will be granted by the Fund of Common Wealth via their commercial bank. Banks’ profits 
should derive from the prices of the services that they offer to their customers; competition should 
keep these prices low. 
      A substantial feature of such a reform would be the creation of a mechanism directed to the 
achievement,  through the firms’ investment, of the yearly rate of accumulation projected by the 
community,  thus  avoiding  or  reducing  substantially  the  possibility  of  a  deficiency  of  global 
demand.  It would also act as a stimulus to entrepreneurship. A major condition for the effectiveness 
of the mechanism is that  bankers provide sufficient credit to firms to allow them to achieve the  
community’s  projected  accumulation  rate.  Therefore,  if  the  banks’  requests  for  capital  do  not 
exhaust the fund set aside for accumulation, the difference should be assigned compulsorily by the 
Fund  of  Common  Wealth  to  banks  (say  in  proportion  to  the  amount  each  has  requested),  for 
distribution among investing firms. This implies that, if the propensity to invest is low, banks will  
be forced to lower the prices for their services so that all the funds allotted to them for investment  
may be placed with the applicant firms. Vice versa, if the amount of capital provided by the Fund of 
Common Wealth is lower than the total applications of banks based on the firms’ borrowing, the 
negative difference will  be deducted from those requests, in inverse proportion to the applicant 
firms’ profit rates. This guideline of equality between the allocations for saving and investment is of 
crucial  importance  for the control  of aggregate demand;  in  particular,  it  moderates  the cyclical 
effects of entrepreneurial euphoria or pessimism. Moreover, it  stimulates entrepreneurship since, 
when demand for credit is slack, firms may obtain inexpensive loans, as banks are required to lend 
funds  up  to  the  accumulation  target.  So  banks  are  induced  to  make  golden  bridges  to 
entrepreneurship.
     If  the  propensity  to  invest  is  low,  the  duty of  attaining  the  established  aggregate  rate  of 
accumulation may cause heavy losses to the banking system. But this does not represent a problem 
for public banks, for which the profit rate is  only  an indicator of success (accountability role); in 
fact, the relative degree of success may also be expressed by the inverse of the rate of loss.
    The processes of globalization generate an increasing, and increasingly complicated role for the 
financial system in the contemporary world economy. By contrast, production, even if projected on 
a world scale, is subjected to largely national and local constraints. Moreover, production suffers 
from the clear  –  and yet  often  undecipherable  -  hegemony of  the  financial  side.  The financial 
system devised here should eliminate the complications, tricks and unconstrained speculations of 
current financial systems, with their worldwide power over production.
 
7.2  Production and distribution within the market operating as a pure mechanism of imputation of  
costs and efficiency
We delineate now  another functional imperative, this time requested by the phase of conflictual-
consumeristic capitalism, that is, to avoid the afflictions and contradictions that the advent of this 
Theory and social change’ (Routledge 2010), chapter 8  by A. Fusari, I have shown the exogenous nature of interest rate  
and the possibility to  reduce to zero its rate expressed in real terms. It must be added that the zeroing of real interest  
rate is also important to avoid a main cause of growing inequalities in income distribution that Piketty 2014 underlines  
as consequent to the tendency of interest rate r to exceed the rate of growth g. 
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phase has implied, as discussed mainly in section 4. This functional imperative mainly consists in 
what we shall denominate ‘separation principle’ of income distribution from production, but not 
vice-versa.
     We have seen in section 2 that the operation of dynamic competition, the basic feature of modern 
economies, is expressed by the interaction between entrepreneurship, innovation and uncertainty in 
the context of the market mechanism.  Both in private and public companies (operating for the 
market), the only reliable indicator of success and hence of responsibility is the profit rate21. All 
other significant indices refer only to particular aspects of entrepreneurial action; they are partial 
and may accordingly become misleading.
      We also know that the operation of dynamic competition has determined a succession of phases 
of development that tends to accelerate in the course of time, and that each one of those phases is 
distinguished by some new functional imperatives. 
  One main goal of our reformist  proposal  is  to delineate  the widest possible bounds of social 
equality, in ways that are consistent with freedom, efficiency and development: in other words, we 
are seeking to find the preconditions guaranteeing the highest degree of social equality that modern 
society may achieve22. The pursuit of these aims requires the transformation of the market into a 
pure  mechanism  of  imputation  of  costs  and  efficiency.  Such  a  transformation  needs  the 
establishment of a special fund; therefore some preliminary considerations are necessary to clarify 
the nature of this fund.
     The relation of economics and social science vis-à-vis the market is twofold: on the one hand, 
the  market  has  been  considered  as  a  potent  vector  of  immorality,  instability  and  social 
precariousness, and because of this, many have called for its wholesale abolition; on the other, the 
market has been understood as an institution indispensable to the efficiency of production, which, at 
most, is allegedly thought of requiring but the complement of social welfare to run perfectly. The 
first  course  of  action  is  completely  senseless  in  modern  dynamic  societies,  while  the  second 
perspective appears nowadays utterly insufficient23. 
     We wish to offer a different model, which operates a profound transformation of the market 
mechanism, and which is predicated, among other things, on the creation of a special fund, a Fund 
of Community Wealth that should enable the system to conjugate the achievement of the highest 
possible productive efficiency with freedom in the distribution of income. More precisely, it will be 
proved that this Fund is crucial to the pursuit of four main aims: business efficiency, distributive 
justice, full employment, and individual autonomy. As far as we can tell, there is no example of 
such a fund in the present and past ages.  Let  see how our proposal  functions by starting with 
production.
     In the proposed model of organization,  the firm buys the goods, factors of production and 
services required by its productive decisions on the market, at market price, just as it does today. 
But it does not pay wages; instead it pays the price of labour as computed by Work Offices on the 
basis of the demand and supply of the various types of labour24. 
21 The well-known Lange and Lerner’s rules, that should drive the entrepreneurial behaviour in market socialism, make 
sense only in a static economy, that is, excluding innovation and uncertainty.  Therefore,  they cannot be referred to  
reality.
22 The treatment of this topic bears some resemblance to J. Rawls’ investigation (see J. Rawls 1971); but our analysis is 
more specific and operative than that of this author, it being specifically concentrated on the concrete management of  
market relationships.
23 The debate on market socialism in the years between the two wars was hinged on the hypothesis of a stationary 
economy, which does not need entrepreneurship, and thus made room to the formulation both of a centralized model of 
the economy, as elaborated by E. Barone in the essay on ‘The Minister of Production in the Collectivist State’, as well 
as of that of a decentralized model of market socialism, with the manager’s decision-making simply dictated by Lange,  
Lerner and Taylor’s rule. (see A.P.Lerner 1938, O. Lange and F, M Taylor 1938
24 As is well known, demand and supply give, by themselves, relative prices. So, to obtain the nominal prices of labour  
it  is  necessary to  refer  to some labour price  expressed in  money units or,  taking variations,  refer  to  initial  prices  
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     However,  the  firm  may  pay  incentives  to  its  workers  and  also  overtime,  if  it  deems  it 
advantageous.
     Moreover, companies will pay into the fund a penalty for any damages to the environment; 
conversely,  they should receive contributions  for any social  benefits  deriving from their  action. 
Firms are also taxed. Finally, they may have to pay into the fund a surplus over regular labour cost 
to assist the transfer of workers from the district of origin. The purpose of this is to stimulate capital  
to flow toward labour,  so as to minimize  the effects  of uprooting,  congestion and urbanization 
generated by migration.
     At the end of the production phase, the firm will sell output at market prices. With the proceeds, 
it will cover constant and variables costs, including capital depreciation and costs on borrowing, as 
well as taxation.
     The difference between revenue and costs, divided by capital employed, yields the profit rate.
In addition to incentives and overtime paid directly by the firm, workers are entitled to a portion of 
the Fund of Community Wealth. The determination of this portion and its distribution among social 
groups will follow criteria defined outside the firms, in the political sphere and through negotiations 
among social  groups and their representatives.  The share of each occupational group in income 
distribution may also depend, in part, on supply and demand for each kind of labour specialization; 
that is, each group’s share may be augmented or decreased, depending on whether demand for that 
type of labour is greater or less than supply. In this way, the balance between labour demand and 
supply will be fostered by variations of supply, not only by the reaction of demand to changes in the 
price of labour. Each worker will be entitled to receive, from the Fund of Community Wealth, a 
compensation proportional to his working time (but not overtime work, which as noted is paid by 
the  firm)  multiplied  by  the  hourly  compensation  for  his  skill.  To  reduce  transactions,  firms 
themselves may pay this compensation, deducting it from their payments to the Fund of Community 
Wealth.
     At the end of each year, along with the share of output to distribute to labour in the next year, the 
average gain in labour productivity will be calculated and the share of that increase to be allocated 
to labour income and the share allocated to a reduction in working time will be set. This allocation 
converts technological progress into higher labour income and free time, not unemployment. People 
look for jobs by direct contact with firms and following the suggestions of Job Centers, which have 
the  knowledge  of  the  demand  and  supply  conditions  for  various  skills  (because  they  monitor 
demand and supply in order to set the price of each skill that firms have to pay into the fund of 
community wealth). Everyone chooses the job he finds more gratifying (by the type of activity, 
responsibility, distance from home, etc.) and, if he is satisfied, he will keep his job; otherwise he 
will continue to search for more satisfactory employment. In case of collective dismissals, due for 
instance to a firm’s closing or downsizing, the dismissed labourers will receive benefits for the time 
needed to find another job.
     We can see that this model does not consider labour as a commodity that wage earners sell to the 
firm but as a service to productive system that entitles the worker to share in income generated. To 
prevent people from choosing not to work, in fact, the principle must be that except for those unable 
to work, the condition for a person to share in the community’s income is that he be employed.
    In this  organization of production,  large-scale long-term unemployment is prevented by the 
perfect flexibility of the price of labour with respect to demand and supply for various skills. As the 
price paid by firms for the use of labour skills is determined by the Job Centres on the basis of 
supply and demand, a labour glut would drive down its price and cost, and thus stimulates firms (in  
the search for profit) to employ more labour and adopt capital-saving technology.  The opposite 
happens if labour is scarce. This should push labour demand and supply toward equilibrium25. The 
expressed in money units.
25
 Sraffa’s demonstration of the re-switch of techniques is not relevant in this context; it only shows the erroneousness of 
the notion of average period of production and of the explanation of the interest rate on the basis of capital productivity; 
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tendency is strengthened if the education system produces versatile workers, enabling people to find 
various  kinds  of  gratifying  jobs.  But  to  move  the  economy toward  full  employment  it  is  also 
necessary to pay attention to guaranteeing the equilibrium between aggregate demand and supply. 
This need is particularly strong in modern dynamic societies, with their continuous local and global 
changes and adjustments. Even more, one must consider that knowledge and its evolution come 
largely from experience26; so that people excluded from the productive process are also excluded 
from important channels of knowledge and will be increasingly unable to avoid marginalization and 
alienation. 
     It may be useful, at this point, for a better comprehension of the proposed revision of market  
dynamics, to work out a more extensive critique of some important aspects of the existing economic 
systems and ideologies, in the light of this very model.
     If, as in the capitalist order, the distribution of income between labour and capital is the result of 
the clash between wage earners and firms, unemployment cannot be eradicated. For employers, to 
counter  unions  and  working  people’s  demands,  do,  in  fact,  use  the  infallible  weapon  of 
unemployment. If profits are low or firms incur losses, dismissals rise to crush labour’s pretensions, 
and in dynamic economies, firms may also try, with the help of technical progress, to save on labour 
where it causes rigidities. It is senseless to found protection of labour on laws, norms and rules that 
oppose the mobility of labour: indeed, such legislation is one of the key impediments to the increase 
in employment.
     It seems clear that the establishment of a fully flexible labour market, which is indispensable in 
modern  dynamic  economy,  requires  the  abolition  of  wages  set  at  the  company  and collective  
bargaining level.  This  is  all  the  more  urgent  in  that  ordinary  collective  bargaining  does  cause 
inefficiencies in the use of labour and make unemployment physiological. Uniformity of national 
wage agreements  and some other  rigidities  swell  the underground economy in the areas  where 
labour productivity is too low for the national wage rate. These illegal  activities allow a fierce 
exploitation  of  workers,  who  have  no  protection  whatever.  And  the  worst  of  it  is  that  this 
underground economy is often the only alternative to unemployment.
     Trade unions must seriously consider the severe restraints on their bargaining power. They may 
win as long as the claims of labour lubricate the entrepreneurial system, as wages, increasing in step 
with productivity gains, stimulate consumption, hence sales, and eventually lead to an improvement 
in the condition of the working in the name of social peace and efficiency. But as soon as profits 
fall, unions find it impossible to force employers to pay higher wages. In substance, the game of 
wage  bargaining  is  always  dominated  by  the  employers,  who  are  most  often  propelled  by 
competition, avidity and unscrupulous behaviour. It is surprising that Trade Unions, whose function 
is to defend labour, have not understood that the root of exploitation is the institution of wage 
labour itself. It is a misfortune that the distribution of income is so largely determined by wage 
earnings.
     Conflict between labour and capital over wage rates is the worst possible method of income 
distribution and works as a powerful obstacle to production. The task of firms is to produce material 
wealth and create jobs. They should be able to do so without being plagued by the perennial conflict 
with labour, which may be seen as an inappropriate social conflict since it takes place in the wrong 
place.  Income  policies  to  remedy  the  conflict  demonstrate  the  failure  of  the  company  wage 
approach. They are a rather tortuous way of establishing some kind of income distribution more 
rational than that implied by the ‘labour market’. It is crucial to bring income distribution outside  
the firm, as far as this is possible. This is indispensable to full employment and company efficiency  
consistent with social justice and individual autonomy. Trade unions should oversee health and  
safety at the work place. They should fight for the distribution of the Fund of Common Wealth, but  
not for the company wage.
moreover, it makes the hypothesis that wage rate is exogenous, that disregards the relation between wage rate and the 
supply and demand of labour.
26 M. Polanyi’s pioneering insistence on tacit knowledge has provided a deep and extensive illustration of this aspect
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     Let me also point out that the idea of the workers’ self-management27 of the firm is mistaken. 
And the workers’ remuneration based on firms’ results is a vehicle of inequalities and managerial 
degeneracy. Firms must be managed by entrepreneurs, and must not be involved in the struggle 
over income distribution.
     Entrepreneurs’  ability  in  decision-making  and innovating  must  not  be  constrained  by the 
decision-power of incompetent persons. The entrepreneur must be responsible in terms of results, 
i.e. profit rate, not subjected to the command of a non-entrepreneurial body. Besides, the rational 
organization of the economy requires that firms pay for the resources they utilize, including labour, 
at prices determined by supply and demand. This is a fundamental rule of efficiency, indispensable 
both to rational use of the resources available and to defeating unemployment. Income distribution 
is  a  totally  different  matter,  one  that  concerns  society  as  a  whole.  The  usual  forms  of  wage  
bargaining obstruct efficient utilization of resources and prevent farseeing policies of distribution  
of  wealth. Such  bargaining  is  the  product  of  spontaneous  evolution,  a  sort  of  ‘primitive’ 
organizational form of society. An advanced society should be able to supplant those institutions 
with better thought-out organizational forms.
     Moreover, the strict link between the production and distribution of income -or, more precisely, 
the fact that the distributive conflict affects business accounts -, seriously undermines the firms’ 
investment,  as  well  as  economic  growth  and  employment.  Aggregate  investment  must  be 
determined by the community and as part of the process of income distribution. This aspect has 
been clarified in discussing how firms should be financed.
     In conclusion, it should be clear that income distribution concerns the entire society and that 
even production is a social entity since it depends on productive forces engendered by society, such 
as techniques and knowledge. Some ingenuous theories of exchange value have long maintained 
that there is an unbreakable connection between income production and distribution. But no such 
connection exists, except the part due to incentives and the fact that income distribution influences 
production through the propensity to consume.
     In particular, it is senseless to attribute to exchange value an ethic-ideological content as, for 
instance, the labour-value theory does. The statement value = labour makes some sense only in a 
stationary economy.  In an economy based on innovation, wealth is, for a large part,  a result  of 
creativity, genius, and of the entrepreneurial search and intuition. Price is, therefore, a completely 
different thing from labour-value, and there is no bridge between the two. Really, exchange value 
displays  only  the  mere  functional  price  role.  Precisely,  it  acts  as  an  indicator  of  productive 
opportunities  and relative  abundance,  and as  a  means  to  make  homogeneous  a  multiplicity  of 
commodities  physically  different  from each  other;  its  role  is  thus  to  facilitate  comparison  and 
exchange among these goods. So the ethic and ideological flavour of the labour-value hypothesis, 
with its  implications  on income distribution,  expresses  not  only a  limiting  but  also a  senseless 
formulation of the much wider ethical and ideological problem.
     The organization of production, distribution and exchange as discussed here attributes a social 
content both to income production and to distribution. Moralists and social reformers have always 
considered the market a gymnasium for corruption and aggressiveness, a place of violent contrasts 
among men, an open space for selfishness and fraud; in brief, it’s been depicted as one of the worst  
instruments of domination, oppression and exploitation of man by man. But we have seen that the 
market can be shorn of these unpleasant attributes and transformed into a mere mechanism for the 
imputation  of  costs  and  the  stimulus  to  efficiency  through  prices,  which  serve  to  signal  the 
availability  of  each  commodity.  We  have  also  seen  that  the  market  mechanism,  aided  by 
competition, and combined with a profit rate as an indicator of success (which, as such, allows 
accountability) can be a highly effective mechanism for stimulating efficient decision- making and 
management in the absence of monopolistic privileges and under the clear and inescapable rule of 
27 Where «workers have control over the production process in the enterprise in which they work, since they have 
ultimate authority,  one-person, one-vote,  on the enterprise itself» See D. Schweickart,  in  Market Socialism  (1998), 
edited by B. Ollman, Routledge, New York and London, p. 127.
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law (designed to prevent bribes and other abuses). The disconnection of the market mechanism from  
the struggle for income distribution makes for efficiency, individual initiative and social justice,  
and may thus be relied upon to turn selfishness into healthy rivalry.
     We call our approach a ‘necessary’ model. It also includes the costs of factors as determined by 
their availability, but just in the mere quality of production costs, that is, excluding any implications 
(except material incentives, as previously noted) on income distribution, this latter being the object 
of policy choices. For its part, the profit rate (intended separately from interest on capital) mainly 
plays an accountability role or, more explicitly, is primarily a measure of the degree of success of 
entrepreneurial  actions  and  decisions,  both  in  private  and  public  firms.  These  features  of  our 
‘necessary’ model and, in particular, the implied exogenous nature of income distribution, warrant 
the  inference  that  the  operation  of  the  production  side  is  only  affected  by  the  availability  of 
resources (and, of course, by demand) and would allow the restoration of a genuinely exogenous 
role of money. 
     
8.   Conclusion
This  essay has shown that the growing varieties of theories and visions characterizing economic 
thought is mainly due to some basic misunderstandings on the changeable economic and social 
reality,  instead of being the expression of a sound and fecund pluralism. The misunderstandings 
darken, among other things, the meaning and the propulsive role of ideologies. In the absence of 
science,  men have recourse to intuition and common sense.  But  this  is  not  enough to face the 
growing  change  caused  by  the  rapid  development  of  knowledge  on  natural  phenomena  and 
technology.
    The above cognitive penury has heavy consequences at world scale, the reduction of which needs 
a penetrating criticism of the economic system that dominates to day the international landscape.
     One of the chief economic problems of the West has been its increasing reliance on a strange 
sense of sublimated superiority, which it has erroneously imputed to the most proximate origin of 
its  wealth:  the  capitalist  market.  The  inference  is  mistaken  in  that  the  source  of  this  wealth, 
whatever the merits and demerits of its nature and uses, lies in human ingenuity rather than in the 
capitalist  machine.  Capitalism is  not  western  inventiveness  as  a  whole;  it  is  but  a  proprietary 
scheme that has usurped the fruits of western creation. And this tragic qui pro quo, has led the West  
to clash violently with the rest of the world. In truth, the capitalist system is the source of so many 
disadvantages to the westerners themselves: namely, social injustice poisoned labour relations and 
the threat to human dignity, social and geographical disequilibria, the wideness of fluctuations, the 
sorceries and distortions promoted by the hegemony of finance capital, and finally the suffocation 
of entrepreneurship, freedom and growth.
     The present essay has attempted to show a possible way to remedy these ills, in particular the 
pervasive and distorting influence of the current market  and financial  systems. Our aim was to 
devise a model that couples efficiency with social justice, structural consistency with innovation; a 
system able to eliminate speculation and unnecessary (if not senseless) strife, while preserving the 
conflicts implicit in the very functioning of a dynamic society, such as the battle between innovators 
and conservatives. And we have shown that a proper functioning of the market is not inconsistent 
with man’s noble propensities, and that it may very well reduce fraud and greed.
     The necessary set of conditions to achieve this goal consists of: 1) the reduction of the market to a 
mere mechanism for imputation of costs and of efficiency, 2) an expansion of the sphere in which 
public firms are allowed to operate within the market, 3) and a drastic reform of the banking system. 
More in particular,  we have dwelled on: the essential  role of the profit rate as an instrument  of 
accountability  for  all  concerns  (public  and private);  the  means  of  re-building  a  non-capitalistic 
economic  body  with  a  free  market;  and  a  model  of  capital  accumulation  able  to  stimulate 
entrepreneurship,  and  to  achieve  the  aggregate  accumulation  rate  –  a  rate  to  be  set  by  the 
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community, with a view to eliminating the tumorous growth of overhead and interest charges and the 
volatile disasters of finance capital.
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